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Abstract
This paper studies the redistribution and welfare effects of increasing the flex-
ibility of individual pension take-up. We use an overlapping-generations model
with Beveridgean pay-as-you-go pensions, where individuals differ in ability and
life span. We find that introducing flexible pension take-up can induce a Pareto
improvement when the initial pension scheme contains within-cohort redistribu-
tion and induces early retirement. Such a Pareto-improving reform entails the
application of uniform actuarial adjustment of pension entitlements based on av-
erage life expectancy. Introducing actuarial non-neutrality that stimulates later
retirement further improves such a flexibility reform.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, the effective retirement age has declined in almost all Western coun-
tries while at the same time life expectancy has increased substantially. These devel-
opments led to an increase of the average retirement period relative to the working
period thereby eroding the fiscal sustainability of pension schemes. To reverse this
trend, in recent years more attention has been given to pension reforms that improve
labour supply incentives and encourage people to work longer. Countries like the UK
and Australia, for example, introduced a flexible retirement age and increased the re-
ward to continue working. The advantage of this type of reforms is that it not only
reduces the labour market distortions caused by incentives to retire early but can also
increase the sustainability of pension systems.
A potential disadvantage is, however, that these flexibility reforms are typically im-
plemented in a uniform way, i.e., applied to all participants in the same way, while
individuals have heterogenous characteristics (e.g., in terms of life expectancy or in-
come level). Uniformly implemented reforms therefore probably have different wel-
fare effects at the individual level and may affect certain types of individuals neg-
atively.1 Indeed, it is well-known that pension schemes based on uniform policy
rules contain large redistribution effects within and across generations, some inten-
tional, and others unintentional (see e.g., Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001 and Bo-
nenkamp, 2009). For example, unfunded pension schemes, especially those of the
Beveridgean type, often contain redistribution from high to low incomes. Apart from
this, these pension schemes typically also redistribute from short-lived to long-lived
agents because they are based on collective annuities which do not depend on indi-
vidual life expectancy. This makes collective annuities subject to the objection that
they lead to more regressive pension schemes because it is well-known that average
longevity tends to increase with income (see e.g., Pappas et al., 1993, Adams et al.,
2003, Meara et al., 2008). Pension reforms that introduce more flexibility in pension
take-up will affect these redistribution effects. It is therefore important to take into
account the redistribution in existing pension schemes and the fact that individuals
are heterogenous when analyzing the welfare effects of pension flexibility reforms.
This paper explores the redistribution and welfare effects of the introduction of
a flexible starting date for pension benefits in the context of an unfunded pension
scheme with an explicit redistribution motive. That means, we consider a change
from a payout scheme in which benefits start at the fixed statutory retirement age
to a scheme where benefits start at the flexible effective retirement age. This flexi-
ble pension take-up is combined with actuarial adjustments of pension benefits for
early or late retirement. To analyse the economic implications of this reform, we use
1In the Netherlands for example there was a lot of discussion whether a reform aimed at increasing
the retirement age would not hurt the low-skilled too much as these people typically start working
earlier and have a shorter life span and therefore prefer to retire early.
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a two-period overlapping-generations model populated with agents who differ in
ability and life span. It is assumed that the life span of an individual is positively
linked to his productivity. The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system is of the
Beveridgean type and is characterized by life-time annuities and proportional con-
tributions. In this way, the pension scheme includes two types of intragenerational
redistribution, from high-income earners to low-income earners and from short-lived
to long-lived agents. Note that, in contrast to the former, the latter type of redistri-
bution is regressive due to the positive link between productivity and longevity. The
fact that individuals are heterogenous implies that introducing pension flexibility will
affect individuals differently.
Implementing pension contracts with a variable starting date for benefits, as anal-
ysed in this paper, is important for various reasons. It helps individuals to adjust the
timing of pension income according to their own preferences and circumstances. This
is particularly relevant for people who have a preference to retire early but who are
prevented to do that because of liquidity or borrowing constraints. Flexible pensions
can also function as a hedge against all types of risks, like disability risks (Diamond
and Mirrlees, 1978) or financial risks (Pestieau and Possen, 2010). This paper adds
some other arguments. We will illustrate that flexible pensions can stimulate people
to postpone retirement voluntary. In that case flexible pension take-up may help to
bear the increasing fiscal burden of ageing. We also show that flexible pension take-
up could be used to reduce the element of regressive redistribution in social security
schemes. Dependent on the information publicly available, the government can ap-
ply different actuarial adjustment factors to different agents as a way to get rid of the
unintended redistribution from short-lived to long-lived agents.
The main results are as follows. First, introducing a flexible pension take-up cannot
be Pareto improving if the government conditions the adjustment factor of benefits
on individual life expectancies. Individual actuarial adjustment eliminates the unin-
tended redistribution from short-lived to long-lived agents. The low-skilled therefore
benefit from this reform at the expense of the high-skilled. Second, introducing a flex-
ible pension take-up can be Pareto improving if the actuarial adjustment of benefits
occurs in a uniform way (i.e., based on the average life expectancy). Uniform benefit
adjustment leads to selection effects in the retirement decision which may reduce ini-
tial tax distortions. For the high-skilled individuals the uniform reward rate for later
retirement is too high from an actuarial point of view, which reduces their implicit tax
and stimulates them to continue working. If the contribution rate is sufficiently high,
the low-skilled also gain because they receive higher pensions, enabled by the addi-
tional tax payments of the high-skilled. Third, combining uniform adjustment with
actuarial non-neutrality to induce people to postpone retirement can further improve
the reform, i.e., a Pareto improvement can be achieved at a lower contribution rate or
for a given contribution rate the welfare effects are more positive for all individuals.
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This paper is related to studies that analyse the interaction between pension schemes
and retirement decisions (see e.g., Hougaard Jensen et al., 2003) and to a growing lit-
erature that focuses on the role of alternative pension systems when income and life
expectancy are correlated (see e.g., Borck, 2007; Hachon, 2008 and Cremer et al., 2010).
In addition, our paper is also related to Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010) and Jaag et al.
(2010) who investigate the labour market impact of pension reforms towards more
actuarial neutrality. Most of these aforementioned studies focus on pension reforms
that strengthen the link between contributions and benefits. Our study, in contrast,
deals with the implementation of a flexible pension take-up.
This paper is most closely related to Cremer and Pestieau (2003). They consider
a pension reform that generates the same ’double dividend’ as the flexibility reform
considered in this study: an increase in economic efficiency and an increase in redis-
tribution from people with high income to people with low income. To obtain this
outcome, both studies need that the benefit rule of the social security scheme redis-
tributes within generations and that there is an initial retirement distortion (i.e., early
retirement), the removal of which brings additional resources. However, the studies
differ in the reforms they focus on. Cremer and Pestieau (2003) analyse an increase
in the effective retirement age and the driving force behind their efficiency improve-
ment is the implementation of age-dependent tax rates, which are higher for young
than for old agents. Our study, in contrast, focuses on a more commonly implemented
reform, the introduction of a flexible pension take-up. In our setting, the efficiency im-
provement stems from selection effects in the retirement decision, induced by uniform
actuarial adjustment. As such, actuarial benefit adjustment provides an additional in-
strument to the government to specifically reduce distortions on the extensive margin
of labour supply.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the benchmark model.
This model contains a PAYG social security scheme with inflexible pension take-up
and life-time annuities. Section 3 analyses the redistribution and welfare effects of
reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility of individual pension take-up. In Section 4
we elaborate on these flexibility reforms by introducing non-neutral actuarial adjust-
ment of benefits. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a two-period overlapping-generations model of a small open economy
populated with heterogeneous agents who differ in terms of ability and life span.
Agents decide upon the amount of savings in the first period and upon the length
of the working period in the second period of life. The individual ability level deter-
mines whether an agent supplies labour as a low-skilled worker or as a high-skilled
worker. High-skilled workers earn a higher wage rate than low-skilled workers. The
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model includes a Beveridgean social security scheme which offers a life-time annuity
that starts paying out from the statutory retirement age until the end of life. Agents
are allowed to continue their working life after the statutory retirement age or to ad-
vance retirement and stop working before the statutory retirement age. So the statu-
tory retirement age is related to the date agents receive their pension benefit, which is
not necessarily equal to their effective retirement date.
2.1 Preferences
Preferences over first-period and second-period consumption are represented by the
following utility function:
U(c, x) = u(c) + piu(x) (1)
with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0; c is first-period consumption, x is second-period consump-
tion and pi ≤ 1 is the length of the second period. To keep the analysis as simple
as possible we assume that the interest rate and the discount rate are zero.2 Second-
period consumption is defined net of the disutility of labour:
x =
d
pi
− γ
2
( z
pi
)2
(2)
where d is total consumption of goods when old yielding a consumption stream of
d/pi, z denotes the working period and γ is the preference parameter for leisure.
Following Casamatta et al. (2005) and Cremer and Pestieau (2003), we assume a
quadratic specification for the disutility of work. This specification makes the prob-
lem more tractable, but comes with the cost that there are no income effects in labour
supply. Income effects in the retirement decision are found to be small compared to
substitution effects, however, see e.g., Krueger and Pischke (1992) or French (2005).
Observe that the disutility of working is related to the fraction of the second period
spent on working (i.e., z/pi). This implies that for a given retirement age an agent with
a short life span experiences a higher disutility of work than an agent with a long life
span because this short-lived agent works a relatively larger share of his remaining
life time.
2.2 Innate ability and skill level
There are two levels of work skill, denoted by ’low’ (L) and ’high’ (H). Born low-
skilled, an agent can acquire extra skills and become a high-skilled worker by in-
vesting 1− a units of time in schooling in the first period. The rest of the time, a, is
2We also abstract from population- and productivity growth, which implies that the internal rate of
return of the PAYG scheme equals the interest rate so that we can concentrate on the intragenerational
redistribution effects of the PAYG scheme. Relaxing these assumptions would not change our main
results, however.
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devoted to working as a high-skilled worker.
The individual-specific parameter a reflects the ability of individuals to acquire high
working skills. The higher is a, the more able is the individual, and the less time
a worker needs to become high-skilled for acquiring a work skill. The parameter a
ranges between 0 and 1 and its cumulative distribution function is denoted by G(·),
i.e., G(a) is the number of individuals with an innate ability parameter below or equal
to a. We henceforth refer to an individual with an innate ability parameter of a as an
a-individual. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the total number of individuals
born in each period to be one, i.e., G(1) = 1.
A high-skilled worker provides an effective labour supply of one unit per unit of
working time, while a low-skilled worker provides only q < 1 units of effective labour
for each unit of working time. This difference in effective labour supply also applies
to the second period of life. Let w denote the wage rate per unit of effective labour,
then the maximum amount of income agents can earn in the first period, denoted by
Wy(a), is given by:
Wy(a) ≡
{
qw for a ≤ a∗
aw for a ≥ a∗ (3)
where a∗ is the cut-off ability level to become high-skilled. It is assumed that a∗ is
exogenous.3 For the second period of life the maximum labour income, Wo(a), equals:
Wo(a) ≡
{
qw for a ≤ a∗
w for a ≥ a∗ (4)
2.3 Individual life span
Each individual lives completely the first period of life (with a length normalized to
unity) but only a fraction pi(a) ≤ 1 of the second period. We assume that pi′(a) ≥ 0:
the higher the innate ability of an agent, the longer the length of life. As a conse-
quence, our model contains a positive association between longevity and skill level.
Since high-skilled agents earn a higher wage rate than low-skilled workers, the model
is in line with the empirical evidence that income positively co-moves with life ex-
pectancy.4
Whenever necessary to parameterize the function pi(a), we will use the following
specification:
pi(a) = p¯i [1+ λ(a− a¯)] , λ ≥ 0 (5)
where a¯ ≡ ∫ 10 a dG denotes the average ability level. This simple function has the
3In Appendix C we work out the model with endogenous schooling like in Razin and Sadka (1999).
As shown, endogenizing the skill level does not change the main results derived in the body of this
paper.
4See Adams et al. (2003) for an extensive listing of studies dealing with the association of socioeco-
nomic status and longevity.
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following appealing properties. First, p¯i represents the average duration of the second
phase of life. Second, there is a positive link between ability and the length of life as
long as λ > 0. Indeed, Cov(pi, a) = λVar(a) ≥ 0. Third, consistent with empirical
findings (Pappas et al., 1993; Mackenbach et al., 2003; Meara et al., 2008), the relative
differences in individual life spans remain constant if the average life span increases.
In absolute terms this means that the socioeconomic gap in longevity gets larger if
average life expectancy increases, i.e., pi(a = 1)− pi(a = 0) = λp¯i; life expectancy of
more able individuals increases more when the average life span rises.
2.4 Consumption and retirement
An individual faces the following intertemporal budget constraint:
c + d = (1− τ)Wy + (1− τ)zWo + P (6)
where τ is the social security contribution (tax) rate and P denotes total pension enti-
tlements received during old age.5
Maximizing life-time utility (1) over c, d and z, subject to the life-time budget con-
straint (6) yields the following first-order conditions:
u′(c) = u′(x) (7)
(1− τ)Wo = γz
pi
(8)
Expression (7) is the standard consumption Euler equation. Equation (8) is the opti-
mality condition regarding retirement and states that the marginal benefit of working
(net wage rate) should be equal to the marginal cost of working (disutility of labour).
From these first-order conditions, we obtain the following expressions for c, x and z
for the benchmark model:
c =
1
1+ pi
[
(1− τ)Wy + (1− τ)
2W2o pi
2γ
+ P
]
(9)
x = c (10)
z =
(1− τ)Wopi
γ
(11)
where P denotes total pension entitlements in the benchmark model. Note that the
social security tax distorts the retirement decision: the larger the contribution rate τ,
the earlier agents leave the labour market, i.e., the lower z, because it reduces the net
wage (and thus the price of leisure). Notice further that our disutility specification
ensures that the retirement period is proportional to longevity, i.e., pi − z = [1− (1−
5It is assumed that individual abilities and life spans are not publicly observable and therefore non-
uniform lump-sum transfers are not available.
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τ)Wo/γ]pi. Hence, a longer life span is split between later retirement and a longer
retirement period. Low-skilled workers retire earlier than high-skilled workers for
two reasons. First, since it is assumed that q < 1, low-skilled people have a lower
wage rate (substitution effect). Second, low-skilled workers will generally have a
shorter life span which induces them to leave the labour force earlier (disutility of
labour effect).
2.5 Social security
The PAYG social security scheme is of the Beveridgean type. In the benchmark model,
agents receive a flat pension benefit b per retirement period which starts at the statu-
tory retirement age h and lasts until the end of the individual old-age period pi. Total
pension entitlements P are then:6
P = (pi − h)b (12)
The fact that the pension benefit is flat, but social security contributions τ are pro-
portional to the wage rate implies that the pension scheme redistributes income from
high-income to low-income individuals. The pension scheme also redistributes from
short-lived to long-lived individuals, however, as individuals receive the flat pension
benefit until their death. The positive link between ability, wages and life expectancy
in our model then implies that there is also some redistribution from low incomes to
high incomes, as the latter group typically has a longer life span.
A feasible social security pension scheme must satisfy the following resource con-
straint:7 ∫ 1
0
P dG = τqw
∫ a∗
0
(1+ zL)dG + τw
∫ 1
a∗
(a + zH)dG (13)
Using equations (5) and (12), we can rewrite this equation as:
b(p¯i − h) = τqw
∫ a∗
0
(1+ zL)dG + τw
∫ 1
a∗
(a + zH)dG (14)
This condition states that the total amount of pension benefits paid out (left-hand
side) equals the total amount of tax contributions received (right-hand side). The first
term on the right-hand side are the tax payments of the low-skilled workers and the
second term are the payments of the high-skilled workers.
As a measure for redistribution, we calculate the net benefit of participating in the
pension scheme. The net benefit is the difference between the total pension benefits
6We impose that pi − h > 0 for any a-individual. In other words, nobody passes away before the
statutory retirement age.
7Throughout this paper subscript ’L’ refers to low-skilled workers and subscript ’H’ refers to high-
skilled workers.
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received and tax contributions paid:
NB ≡ (pi − h)b− τ(Wy + zWo) (15)
An agent is a net beneficiary if total pension benefits received exceeds contributions
paid (i.e., NB > 0). Otherwise, the agent is a net contributor (i.e., NB < 0). A priori
it is not immediately clear whether the low-skilled agents are the net beneficiaries of
this Beveridgean pension system. On the one hand, low-skilled agents benefit from
this pension scheme as they have a lower wage rate and generally retire earlier than
high-skilled agents. On the other hand, low-skilled agents also die earlier than high-
skilled agents which implies that low-skilled agents are negatively affected by the
pension scheme.
Using the definition of net benefits, equation (15), the budget constraint of the pen-
sion scheme implies: ∫ a∗
0
NBL dG +
∫ 1
a∗
NBH dG = 0 (16)
The net benefits of all (young) individuals is equal to zero, reflecting the zero-sum
game nature of the pension scheme.8
3 Pension flexibility reforms
As explained in the Introduction, in recent years many countries have taken measures
to increase work incentives and to stimulate people voluntarily to continue working.
In this section, we consider the welfare and redistribution effects of a pension reform
that allows for a flexible starting date of social security benefits, as recently imple-
mented in e.g., the UK, Finland and Denmark. Introducing a variable starting date
for benefits may help individuals to adjust the timing of pension income according
to their own preferences. We will show that flexible pensions can also help to bear
the costs of ageing or to reduce unintended transfers from short-lived to long-lived
individuals.
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that social security benefits start at the
statutory retirement date, irrespective of the individual’s effective retirement date. In
this section we impose that the benefits start at the time the individual actually leaves
the labour market. If a person then retires later than the statutory retirement age, he
receives an increment to his benefits for later retirement, and when this person retires
earlier, he receives a decrement. The imposed coincidence of pension take-up and
retirement is a realistic assumption because in practice flexible pension schemes often
8With a positive interest rate the sum of net benefits would be negative as in that case all future
generations have to pay for the windfall gain given to the old generation at the time the pension scheme
was introduced.
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contain legal restrictions to continue work after a person has opted for benefits.9 We
will first discuss the actuarial adjustment of benefits in general. The specific cases of
individual actuarial adjustment and uniform actuarial adjustment of benefits will be
discussed in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Actuarial adjustment of benefits
Suppose the government pays benefits p to an individual over his whole effective
retirement period. Total pension entitlements are then equal to P = (pi− z)p. Pension
earnings per retirement period p are given by:
p = m(z, pˆi)b (17)
where b is the reference flat pension benefit independent of contributions and labour
history. The factor m(·) is the actuarial adjustment factor which determines to what
extent the reference benefit b will be adjusted when agents retire later or earlier than
the statutory retirement age and is given by:
m(z, pˆi) =
p¯i − h
pˆi − z (18)
where we impose pˆi − z > 0 to make sure that m(·) > 0 to rule out negative pension
benefits. The adjustment factor is equal to the ratio between the average retirement pe-
riod and the individual retirement period measured by the reference life-span param-
eter pˆi which will be specified below. At the individual level, actuarial non-neutrality
arises when pˆi differs from pi. The function m(·) is an increasing function in the in-
dividual retirement decision z; when an agent decides to continue to work after the
statutory retirement age the pension benefit in the remaining retirement periods will
be adjusted upwards.
We consider two scenarios for the life span to be used in the adjustment factor which
differ with respect to the information set available to the government. In the first sce-
nario, the government can observe individual life expectancies and uses adjustment
factors based on individual life spans (pˆi = pi). The government can then get rid of the
adverse redistribution from short- to long-lived individuals. The implication of this
is, however, that the high-skilled will be harmed by this reform while the low-skilled
gain, and a Pareto improvement is not possible. In reality the government cannot
observe individual life expectancies. We therefore assume in Section 3.2 that the gov-
ernment applies a uniform actuarial adjustment factor, based on the average life span
of the population (pˆi = p¯i). This uniform actuarial adjustment introduces selection
9In countries like Portugal, Spain and France the coincidence of pension take-up and retirement is
regulated by law. In the Dutch flexible second-pillar schemes the access to pension benefits is also
conditional on dismissal.
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effects in the retirement decision, long-lived agents have an incentive to postpone re-
tirement, while short-lived agents have an incentive to advance retirement. We show
that in this reform scenario a Pareto improvement is possible.
3.1 Individual actuarial adjustment of benefits
To set the scene, we take a rather extreme position in this section and assume that the
government can observe individual life spans and uses this information to assess the
adjustment of benefits.
Actuarial adjustment factor
With individual adjustment, pˆi = pi, the individual-specific adjustment factor m and
the pension entitlements P become:
m =
p¯i − h
pi − z (19)
P = (p¯i − h)b (20)
Note from equation (19) that m = 1 for an agent with an average ability level (a = a¯)
who retires at the statutory retirement age h. For this so-called average individual the
pension benefit per retirement period is equal to the reference benefit, i.e., p = b. In
case this person retires later than the statutory retirement age, then m > 1, implying
that the per-period benefit is adjusted upwards, i.e., p > b. On the other hand, when
the person retires earlier than the statutory retirement age, we have m < 1 and p < b.
The retirement decision is actuarially neutral because the effective retirement age
has no effect on the total pension entitlements P, i.e., ∂P/∂z = 0. Agents cannot
increase their total pension entitlements by postponing or advancing retirement. Any
individual, irrespective of life span, income or skill level, receives exactly the same
amount of life-time pension benefits.
Consumption and welfare effects
The retirement decisions are the same as in the benchmark social security model
(zben = zind).10 The aggregate budget constraint of the pension contract also does
not change, implying that the pension benefit per retirement period stays the same as
10In the rest of this paper, subscript ’ben’ refers to the benchmark model and subscript ’ind’ to the
flexible model based on individual actuarial adjustment of benefits. We only use subscripts if it is strictly
necessary, i.e., in equations in which we compare one of the flexibility reforms with the benchmark case.
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well (bben = bind). Only consumption changes:
cind = cben +
(p¯i − pi)b
1+ pi
(21)
xind = xben +
(p¯i − pi)b
1+ pi
(22)
From these equations we can immediately infer the following result:
Proposition 1. Introducing retirement flexibility using individual actuarial adjustment of
pension benefits implies that the welfare of the short-lived agents (pi < p¯i) increases while the
welfare of the long-lived agents (pi > p¯i) decreases. This reform therefore cannot be a Pareto
improvement.
The intuition for this result is that individual actuarial adjustment removes redis-
tribution related to life-span differences. Agents with short life spans (i.e., the low-
skilled) therefore benefit from this reform at the expense of the agents with long life
spans (i.e., the high-skilled)11,12.
3.2 Uniform actuarial adjustment of benefits
Individual life spans are difficult to observe in practice. Therefore, real-world pension
schemes with a flexible starting date for benefits always rely on uniform actuarial
adjustment factors based on some average life expectancy index. In this section we
show that this uniform adjustment of benefits can increase welfare of all individuals,
i.e., induce a Pareto improvement, although individuals are heterogenous.
Actuarial adjustment factor
With uniform adjustment, the reference life-span index is the same for each agent,
pˆi = p¯i, so the adjustment factor and pension entitlements are:
m =
p¯i − h
p¯i − z (23)
P =
(pi − z)(p¯i − h)b
p¯i − z (24)
11In theory, applying individual-specific conversion factors could result in a Pareto improvement if
we would not restrict benefit adjustments to be actuarially neutral at the individual level.
12The government could also decide to use the skill level of individuals to determine the actuarial
adjustment factor. The advantage of this approach is that skill levels are observable for the government
and are in general correlated with individual life expectancies (see e.g., van Kippersluis et al., 2011).
Appendix B derives this case formally and shows that skill-dependent actuarial adjustment of benefits
cannot result in a Pareto improvement, just like the case where the actuarial adjustment of benefits is
based on individual life expectancies.
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The actuarial adjustment factor m equals one for each individual who retires at the
statutory retirement age, i.e, if z = h, so that p = b. Agents who retire later than h
receive a higher benefit, p > b, and agents who retire earlier receive less, p < b.
From equation (24) we observe that, ceteris paribus, total pension entitlements of
agents with long life spans are higher than the entitlements of agents with short life
spans. This redistribution implies that the pension scheme is not actuarially neutral
at the individual level. As the amount of pension entitlements depends on the indi-
vidual retirement age, uniform actuarial adjustment introduces selection effects in the
retirement decision. To show this, we derive from equation (24):
Ψ(z) ≡ ∂P(z)
∂z
=
(pi − p¯i)p
p¯i − z (25)
For agents with above average life spans (pi > p¯i), Ψ > 0, implying that these agents
have an incentive to postpone retirement as this will increase their life-time pension
income. From an actuarial point of view, the conversion factor of these agents is too
high. For short-lived people (with pi < p¯i) it is just the opposite; for these agents
the conversion factor of continued activity is too low which stimulates early retire-
ment. For these people postponing retirement would simply mean that total pension
entitlements decrease (Ψ < 0).
Consumption and retirement
With flexible pension take-up and uniform actuarial adjustment, the life-time budget
constraint of the a-individual is still equal to equation (6), but now P is defined as in
equation (24). Only the first-order condition regarding retirement changes:
(1− τ)Wo +Ψ(z) = γz
pi
(26)
with Ψ(z) given by equation (25). Consumption and retirement are then equal to:13
cuni = cben +
1
1+ pi
[
Puni − Pben − [Ψ(zuni)]
2 pi
2γ
]
(27)
zuni = zben +
Ψ(zuni)pi
γ
(28)
Equation (28) shows that there is an extra distortion in retirement behaviour. Like
before, we have that the contribution rate induces early retirement (through its impact
on zben). The redistribution effects, represented byΨ, imply an additional distortion in
the retirement decision. This redistribution distortion can either stimulate retirement
or depress retirement, depending on the individual life span pi. For individuals with
13Subscript ’uni’ refers to uniform actuarial adjustment of benefits.
13
below-average life spans (pi < p¯i), Ψ < 0, which implies that these people move
up retirement as a result of uniform actuarial adjustment. If individuals have above-
average life spans (pi > p¯i), then Ψ > 0, and these people will postpone retirement.
Consumption can either be higher or lower compared to consumption in the bench-
mark case. The last term in equation (27) is negative and reflects the utility loss re-
sulting from the redistribution distortion in the retirement decision. Of course, flex-
ibility can also induce a utility gain because an agent can choose the retirement age
which gives him the highest entitlements. This potential gain is captured by the term
Puni − Pben. Note from equations (12) and (24) that total pension benefits are gener-
ally not the same in the benchmark scheme and in the flexibility reform with uniform
adjustment.14
Welfare effects
The welfare effects are not trivial because, compared to the benchmark model, uni-
form adjustment introduces another distortion in the retirement decision which can
work into the opposite direction of the existing distortion related to the contribution
tax. We will show that under certain conditions this reform can lead to a Pareto im-
provement.
Suppose that the reform takes place unexpectedly. First we will analyse how this
reform affects utility of the current old generation. In the benchmark second-period
consumption is equal to:
pixben = sben +
(1− τ)2W2o pi
2γ
+ Pben (29)
where savings are equal to s = (1− τ)Wy − c. After the reform, the first-order condi-
tion for the retirement decision of the old generation is given by equation (26). Using
this condition, old-age consumption after the reform is:
pixuni = sben +
(1− τ)2W2o pi
2γ
+ Puni − [Ψ(zuni)]
2 pi
2γ
(30)
The old generation is not worse off after the reform when u(xuni)− u(xben) ≥ 0, im-
plying:
pixuni − pixben ≥ 0 ⇒ Puni − Pben − [Ψ(zuni)]
2 pi
2γ
≥ 0 (31)
The current young generation and future generations are better off if U(cuni, xuni) ≥
U(cben, xben) for each ability level, which implies, using equation (7), cuni ≥ cben. From
14This difference is not only due to the direct effect of a different adjustment factor, but also to the
effect of the adjustment factor on the retirement decisions which, via the budget constraint of the PAYG
scheme, will in general lead to a different flat reference pension benefit b.
14
equation (27) we can see that the condition for young and future generations is exactly
the same as that for the current old generation. This is due to the fact that there are no
income effects in the retirement decision. Consequently, for a given ability level the
transition generation and all future young generations retire at the same age and thus
have the same amount of life-time income. Hence, when condition (31) is satisfied
and is strictly positive for at least one a-individual, the reform is Pareto improving. To
analyse the possibility of a Pareto improvement we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The statutory retirement age is set equal to the retirement age of the individ-
ual with the average ability level, i.e., h = z(a¯).
This assumption implies that individuals with below-average life span have an in-
centive to advance retirement as from an actuarial point of view the adjustment factor
of retirement postponement is too low for them. Therefore, for these people retir-
ing after the statutory retirement age is not in their interest, ceteris paribus, as it re-
duces pension entitlements compared to the benchmark. For individuals with above-
average life span exactly the opposite holds. These individuals have an incentive
to postpone retirement because the actuarial adjustment factor is too high for them.
Hence, retiring before the statutory retirement is not in their interest.
Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied, we can then derive the following result:
Proposition 2. A pension reform from inflexible Beveridgean pensions towards flexible Bev-
eridgean pensions with uniform actuarial adjustment of pension benefits is a Pareto improve-
ment if and only if τ ≥ τ∗, with τ∗ equal to:
τ∗ =
(γ− qw)√γ− w− (γ− w)√γ− qw
w
√
γ− qw− qw√γ− w (32)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The intuition for this result is as follows. High-skilled workers certainly gain from
this reform because the adjustment factor is too high for them from an actuarial per-
spective. This leads to a lower implicit tax on continued activity and thus later re-
tirement. The welfare of low-skilled workers in principle declines because they are
confronted with higher implicit taxation as their actuarial adjustment factor is too low.
The only way to compensate for this loss is to give the low-skilled more social secu-
rity benefits. If the contribution tax rate is sufficiently high, it is indeed possible that
the continued activity of the more able generates enough resources to compensate the
less able so that ultimately the welfare of all agents is higher.
Uniform actuarial adjustment of benefits gives the government an instrument to re-
duce distortions on the extensive margin of labour supply. This is therefore one way
to obtain additional resources that can be used to meet the increasing fiscal burden
of ageing. Moreover, if the reform is conducted properly, it will also foster redistri-
bution from the rich to the poor. Similar to Cremer and Pestieau (2003), this ’double
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Figure 1: Uniform adjustment: welfare and redistribution
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dividend’ hinges on two conditions. First, the retirement decision in the benchmark
model needs to have a downward distortion, i.e., retirement is too early, and the re-
moval of this distortion therefore brings additional resources. Second, the pension
contract needs to be redistributive from rich to poor people so that most of the cost of
the reform is borne by individuals with relatively high earnings.15
In Figure 1 we show a numerical illustration of the welfare (left graph) and redistri-
bution effects (right graph) of a switch to a flexible scheme based on uniform actuarial
adjustment. The underlying parameterization is as follows. The tax rate τ is 0.3, w = 1
and γ = 2. We further assume h = 1/6 and p¯i = 0.7, which implies an official retire-
ment age of 65 and an average life span of 81 years.16 The heterogeneity parameter
λ is calibrated such that the difference between the life span of high-skilled and low-
skilled agents is at most 3.5 years which is consistent with recent Dutch estimates, this
gives λ = 1/6. We interpret the high skill level as the highest attainable education
levels in the Netherlands (i.e., higher vocational training and university) and the low
skill level as the collective term of all remaining education levels. According to re-
cent figures of Statistics Netherlands, about two third of the Dutch population is low-
skilled (a∗ = 2/3) and these people earn about fourty percent less than high-skilled
agents (q = 0.6). Finally, we assume that ability a follows a uniform distribution, i.e.,
15Cremer and Pestieau (2003) obtain this efficiency gain by age-dependent taxation, i.e., by giving
the young a higher tax rate than the old. However, the advantage of actuarial adjustment is that it is an
additional instrument which specifically applies to the extensive margin of labour supply. The efficiency
improvement can then also arise in a more general set-up that also includes the intensive margin (see
Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010).
16We assume that life time consists of 30 years of childhood that are not accounted for, 30 years of full
potential working time (which can partly be used for tertiary education), and a last period of 30 years.
The official retirement age is therefore 60+ 30h and the average life span is 60+ 30p¯i.
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G(a) = a, and that the utility function is logarithmic, i.e., u(·) = ln(·).
Figure 1(a) shows that the welfare effects of introducing flexible retirement with
uniform adjustment are positive for all high-ability agents. These agents benefit from
a lower implicit tax on continued activity due to the attractive actuarial adjustment
factor and therefore choose to work longer. With these parameter settings, however,
the additional tax contributions are not sufficient to compensate all low-skilled agents
for the higher implicit tax they are confronted with, although most of them experience
an increase in the net benefit from the scheme (see Figure 1(b)). To achieve a Pareto
improvement, the contribution rate needs to be at least 40 percent, that is, τ∗ = 0.4.
There are good reasons to argue that in practice the tax critical rate is lower than
presumed in our analysis. First, income redistribution from rich to poor runs through
more channels than the pension scheme, like the tax system or public health care.
Hence, when high-skilled agents are stimulated to work longer with a flexible pen-
sion take-up, the low-skilled may also be compensated through these other types of
redistribution. Second, in reality the contribution tax is added to other sources of dis-
tortionary taxation. As the deadweight loss is roughly quadratic in the total tax rate,
the marginal welfare improvement of introducing flexible retirement (and lowering
implicit taxation) might be larger than our analysis suggests. In the next section, we
show that a reduction of the tax critical rate can also be obtained by reformulating the
pension reform to some extent, i.e., by setting the reward rate of retirement postpone-
ment above the actuarially-neutral level.
4 Introducing actuarial non-neutrality
In recent years, an increasing number of countries introduced penalties and rewards
for earlier and later retirement. To stimulate work continuation, the penalty rate is
typically not as high as the reward rate, i.e., the adjustment is asymmetric. In the
US, for example, for each year of retirement before the statutory retirement age, the
annual benefit is reduced by 6.75%. The actuarial increment for those retiring after
the statutory retirement age amounts to 8%. In Japan, the difference is even larger,
there the penalty rate of early retirement is 6% per year while the reward rate of later
retirement is 8.4% (OECD, 2011). In this final section we therefore consider a pension
flexibility reform where pension benefits are adjusted in an actuarially non-neutral
way to induce people to postpone retirement. We show that under such a reform a
Pareto improvement can be achieved at a lower contribution rate or that for a given
contribution rate it leads to more positive welfare effects for all individuals.
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Figure 2: Actuarial adjustment factor
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4.1 Actuarial adjustment factor
To make our point as clear as possible, we abstract from life-span heterogeneity in the
analytical analysis. Hence, each agent, irrespective of his ability level, lives a fraction
pi ≤ 1 of the second period. In the simulation graphs, however, we have heterogenous
life spans. The actuarial adjustment factor is specified as follows:
m(z,pi) =
(
pi − h
pi − z
)σ
, σ > 1 (33)
where the parameter σ governs the degree of actuarial non-neutrality of the adjust-
ment factor, this is also shown in Figure 2. In case σ = 1, the adjustment is completely
actuarially neutral with respect to the retirement decision (see Section 3.1). For σ > 1,
the adjustment factor is higher than the actuarially-neutral level if agents retire later
than the statutory retirement age (z > h). On the contrary, the adjustment factor is
lower than the actuarially-neutral level if agents retire earlier than the statutory retire-
ment age (z < h). In other words, specification (33) rewards delaying retirement and
discourages early retirement as long as σ > 1.
Given equation (33), the pension entitlements P are equal to:
P = (pi − h)σ(pi − z)1−σb (34)
Taking the derivative of P with respect to z gives:
Φ(z) ≡ ∂P(z)
∂z
= (σ− 1)p (35)
Hence, if σ > 1 then Φ > 0, i.e., introducing actuarial non-neutrality gives all agents
an incentive to continue working as this will increase pension entitlements.
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4.2 Consumption and retirement
The consumption decision and retirement decision are equal to:17
cnan = cben +
1
1+ pi
[
Pnan − Pben − [Ψ(znan)]
2 pi
2γ
]
(36)
znan = zben +
Ψ(znan)pi
γ
(37)
where P and Ψ are defined by equations (34) and (35), respectively. Taking the deriva-
tive of the retirement choice with respect to the neutrality parameter σ gives (evalu-
ated at σ = 1):
∂z
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=1
=
pip
γ
> 0 (38)
An increase in the neutrality parameter σ leads to later retirement. The introduction
of this kind of non-neutrality in the retirement decision can undo (at least to some ex-
tent) the distortionary effect of the social security tax. This result is comparable with
the situation in the flexibility reform with uniform actuarial adjustment and hetero-
geneous life spans. With uniform actuarial adjustment, however, the pension scheme
is still actuarially neutral on average: high-skilled workers (with a long life span)
receive a subsidy on continuing work whereas low-skilled workers (with a short life
span) experience a tax on delaying retirement. The current reform is different because
now the pension scheme subsidizes work continuation for all agents, irrespective of
skill level.
4.3 Welfare effects
Introducing actuarial non-neutrality does not only stimulate labour supply, it also
leads to a Pareto improvement if the tax rate is sufficiently high.
Proposition 3. Introducing actuarial non-neutrality aimed at stimulating work effort makes
high-skilled workers strictly better off. In addition, the reform is Pareto improving if and only
if τ > τˆ, with:
τˆ =
[1− G(a∗)] ln
(
pi−zL
pi−zH
)
G(a∗) qwpi
γ(pi−zL) + [1− G(a∗)] wpiγ(pi−zH)
(39)
This implicit equation has a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition for this result is similar as in the reform with uniform actuarial adjust-
ment (see Section 3.2). The government can apply non-neutral actuarial conversion
17Subscript ’nan’ refers to not actuarially-neutral adjustment of benefits.
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Figure 3: Neutral versus non-neutral actu-
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of benefits for late retirement as an instrument to increase the total efficiency of the
economy. This subsidy reduces the existing labour supply distortion on the extensive
margin related to the contribution tax rate. With actuarial non-neutrality, however,
the reward rate of retirement postponement is relatively more attractive for agents
who retire later (i.e., the high-skilled), as can also be seen from Figure 2. Therefore, to
ensure that the welfare of the low-skilled also improves, the contribution rate needs
to be sufficiently high so that the additional tax payments of the high-skilled lead to
higher pension benefits.
Figure 3 compares the welfare effects of a uniform adjustment under actuarial neu-
trality (dashed line) and actuarial non-neutrality (solid line). Contrary to the analyt-
ical exposition discussed above, this graph is based on heterogeneous life spans. All
parameter values are the same as those used in the previous graphs. As we have
shown before, a contribution rate of 30 percent is not sufficient to ensure that an ac-
tuarially neutral and a uniform adjustment of benefits is Pareto improving. Figure
3 shows, however, that when a uniform adjustment is combined with actuarial non-
neutrality this has strictly positive welfare effects for all individuals under a contri-
bution rate of 30 percent, i.e., the reform is Pareto improving. This implies that by
introducing actuarial non-neutrality in the pension scheme it is possible to achieve
a Pareto improvement for a lower contribution tax rate. The reason for this result is
that an actuarial non-neutral uniform adjustment gives more incentives for the high-
skilled to retire later and their labour supply in the second period will be higher than
under the actuarially-neutral reform; this will generate more resources to compensate
the low-skilled.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the intragenerational redistribution and welfare ef-
fects of a pension reform that introduces a flexible take-up of pension benefits. To
analyse the economic implications of such a pension reform, we have developed a
stylized two-period overlapping-generations model populated with heterogeneous
agents who differ in ability and life span. The model includes a Beveridgean so-
cial security scheme with life-time annuities. In this way we take into account the
empirically most important channels of intragenerational redistribution: income re-
distribution from rich to poor people and life-span redistribution from short-lived to
long-lived agents.
Our results suggest that introducing a flexible pension take-up with uniform adjust-
ments can induce a Pareto improvement. This reform can collect additional resources
without diminishing the welfare of low-skilled agents and increasing that of high-
skilled agents. In that way it can also help to bear the costs of ageing in a Beveridgean
pension scheme. The selection effects of uniform actuarial adjustment increase the
implicit tax of the low-skilled but decrease the implicit tax of the high-skilled, who
in turn decide to work longer and therefore pay more pension contributions. A nec-
essary condition for such a Pareto improvement is that the contribution tax is suffi-
ciently high so that the continued activity of the high-skilled generates enough tax
revenues to compensate the low-skilled with higher benefits. Increasing the reward
and penalty rates of later and earlier retirement in an actuarially non-neutral way can
help to reduce this tax critical rate. This policy reduces the implicit tax not only of the
high-skilled agents, but also of the low-skilled, implying that the less-skilled agents
need less compensation through the redistributive pension scheme.
In real-world pension schemes that have actuarial adjustment of pension entitle-
ments, this adjustment is indeed independent of individual characteristics, like life
expectancy or skill level. The results of this paper give a rationale for this kind of
uniform flexibility reforms. In recent years, penalties and rewards for earlier or later
retirement have increased in a number of countries (OECD, 2011). However, in most
countries the implemented reductions of early pension benefits do still not fully cor-
respond both to the lower amount of contributions paid by the worker and to the in-
crease in the period over which the worker will receive pension payments (Queisser
and Whitehouse, 2006). This implies that there is still room to improve the pension
systems by going into the direction of complete actuarial neutrality or by moving
even beyond that level, as our analysis of non-actuarial neutral adjustment suggests.
Our benchmark scheme is of the Beveridgean type and characterized by inflexi-
ble pension take-up and life-time annuities. Countries like the UK, the Netherlands
and Denmark indeed follow this tradition. Other countries, like Germany, Italy and
France have Bismarckian pension schemes where pension benefits are linked to for-
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mer contributions. To obtain a Pareto improvement of introducing a variable starting
date for pension benefits, we have argued that the benefit rule must satisfy two char-
acteristics. First, it should contain an initial distortion, the removal of which brings
additional resources. Second, it should have within-cohort redistribution such that
most of the cost of the reform is born by the high-income people. In general, Bis-
marckian pension systems still contain intragenerational redistribution from short- to
long-lived agents but have considerably less redistribution from the rich to the poor.
We therefore expect that the Pareto-improving nature of a flexible pension take-up is
much more difficult to realize in these types of pension schemes.
Other important elements to which we have not paid attention but that might be
important when analysing pension flexibility, are the role of income effects in the re-
tirement decision or social norms. Especially in the short run, flexibility in the pension
age could lead to only small changes in retirement behaviour if agents are used to re-
tire at some socially accepted retirement age. In the long run, however, norms may
change and the effects described in this paper may still apply. To what extent these
kinds of issues would affect our main results, is left for future research.
Our paper, however, provides a rationale why countries with Beveridgean pension
schemes should use uniform rules for the adjustment of pension benefits when they
introduce flexible pension take-up even though people have different skill levels and
life expectancies. It is sometimes argued that it would be preferable to base the actu-
arial adjustment factor on individual life expectancy or skill level. This paper shows
that even in a very simple setting the latter type of pension flexibility reform can-
not be Pareto improving as some of the redistribution in the initial pension scheme
(from the short- to the long-lived) is removed. It is therefore important to take all
types of redistribution in the initial pension scheme into account when discussing the
implementation of flexible pension take-up. Applying uniform actuarial adjustment,
possibly combined with non-neutral elements to increase the incentives to postpone
retirement, could increase the economic efficiency of the pension system. In that way,
this reform generates extra resources to cope with the costs of ageing and make some
people better off while not hurting other people.
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Technical appendix
This appendix contains formal proofs of all propositions mentioned in this paper (Ap-
pendix A). It also derives the effects of a pension flexibility reform where the actuarial
adjustment of benefits is based on the skill level of individuals (Appendix B). Finally,
we present an extension of the basic model by endogenizing the schooling decision
(Appendix C).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We have the following condition for a Pareto improvement:
Γ ≡ Puni − Pben − [Ψ(z)]
2 pi
2γ
=
(pi − z)(p¯i − h)
p¯i − z buni − (pi − h)bben −
[Ψ(z)]2 pi
2γ
≥ 0 (A.1)
where for at least one a-individual this inequality has to hold strictly. We start from
a situation in which each agent has the same life span, i.e., λ = 0. This means that
pi(a) = p¯i for each a-individual and hence Γ = 0. Now we derive the following
derivative at λ = 0:18
∂Γ
∂λ
=
z− h
p¯i − z p¯i(a− a¯)buni + (p¯i − h)
(
∂buni
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
)
(A.2)
To prove that the reform is Pareto improving we have to show that ∂Γ/∂λ ≥ 0, and for
at least one individual it should be strictly positive. Note that Assumption 1 implies
that the minimum of the first term is equal to zero, i.e., for the agent with ability a = a¯.
Hence, the reform is Pareto improving if ∂buni/∂λ ≥ ∂bben/∂λ.
The budget constraint of the pension scheme can be written as:
b(p¯i − h)Φ = X (A.3)
with:
Φ ≡
∫ a∗
0
[
pi − zL
p¯i − zL −
(pi − p¯i)τqwpi
γ(p¯i − zL)2
]
dG +
∫ 1
a∗
[
pi − zH
p¯i − zH −
(pi − p¯i)τwpi
γ(p¯i − zH)2
]
dG (A.4)
X ≡ τqw
∫ a∗
0
[
1+
(1− τ)qwpi
γ
]
dG + τw
∫ 1
a∗
[
a +
(1− τ)wpi
γ
]
dG (A.5)
18To avoid complex calculations that yield no additional insights, we evaluate all derivatives in this
section at the initial point λ = 0.
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Note that in the benchmark model Φ = 1. From equation (A.3), we derive at λ = 0:
∂bben
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
∂X
∂λ
(A.6)
∂buni
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
(
∂X
∂λ
− X ∂Φ
∂λ
)
(A.7)
Hence,
∂buni
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
= − X
p¯i − h
∂Φ
∂λ
(A.8)
From the definition of Φ above and applying Leibniz rule, we obtain:
∂Φ
∂λ
=
p¯i
p¯i − zL
[
1− τqwp¯i
γ(p¯i − zL)
] ∫ a∗
0
(a− a¯)dG
+
p¯i
p¯i − zH
[
1− τwp¯i
γ(p¯i − zH)
] ∫ 1
a∗
(a− a¯)dG
(A.9)
Inserting equation (28) with λ = 0 in this expression, gives:
∂Φ
∂λ
=
γ(γ− qw)
(γ− qw + τqw)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠL
∫ a∗
0
(a− a¯)dG + γ(γ− w)
(γ− w + τw)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠH
∫ 1
a∗
(a− a¯)dG (A.10)
Let τ → 0. Then we have that ΠH > ΠL which implies that the derivative is positive
and thus ∂buni/∂λ < ∂bben/∂λ for any possible cut-off point 0 < a∗ < 1. Taking the
other extreme, τ → 1, we obtain ΠH < ΠL so that the derivative is negative and
∂buni/∂λ > ∂bben/∂λ for any value 0 < a∗ < 1. The derivative is zero if and only if
ΠH (τ∗) = ΠL (τ∗) which has a unique solution 0 < τ∗ < 1 given by equation (32).
Hence, ∂buni/∂λ ≥ ∂bben/∂λ if and only if τ ≥ τ∗. This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. With actuarial non-neutrality, the Pareto-improving condition is19:
Γ ≡ (pi − h)σ(pi − z)1−σbnan − (pi − h)bben − [Ψ (z)]
2pi
2γ
≥ 0 (A.11)
where for at least one a-individual this inequality should hold strictly. Suppose we
start from a situation of actuarial neutrality, σ = 1, which means Γ = 0. Then we
derive the following derivative, evaluated in the initial position σ = 1:
∂Γ
∂σ
= (pi − h) ∂b
∂σ
+ (pi − h)b ln(pi − h)− (pi − h)b ln(pi − z) (A.12)
19In this section, we abstract from life-span heterogeneity, i.e., λ = 0.
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To prove that the reform is Pareto improving we have to show that ∂Γ/∂σ ≥ 0, where
for at least one individual this inequality strictly holds.
Write the budget constraint of the pension scheme in the usual way:
b(pi − h)Φ = X (A.13)
where X is already defined by equation (A.5) and with Φ equal to:
Φ ≡ G(a∗)
[(
pi − zL
pi − h
)1−σ
− τqwpi(σ− 1)(pi − h)
σ−1
γ(pi − zL)σ
]
+ [1− G(a∗)]
[(
pi − zH
pi − h
)1−σ
− τwpi(σ− 1)(pi − h)
σ−1
γ(pi − zH)σ
] (A.14)
Note that Φ = 1 if σ = 1, implying that equation (A.12) can be written as:
∂Γ
∂σ
= (pi − h) ∂b
∂σ
+ X ln(pi − h)− X ln(pi − z) (A.15)
From equation (A.13) it follows:
∂b
∂σ
= − X
pi − h
∂Φ
∂σ
(A.16)
Using definition (A.14), we can derive at σ = 1:
∂Φ
∂σ
= ln(pi − h)− G(a∗)
[
ln(pi − zL) + τqwpi
γ(pi − zL)
]
− [1− G(a∗)]
[
ln(pi − zH) + τwpi
γ(pi − zH)
] (A.17)
Substituting equation (A.17) into equation (A.16) and inserting the resulting expres-
sion in equation (A.12) ultimately implies:
∂Γ
∂σ
= − X ln(pi − z) + G(a∗)X
[
ln(pi − zL) + τqwpi
γ(pi − zL)
]
+ [1− G(a∗)]X
[
ln(pi − zH) + τwpi
γ(pi − zH)
] (A.18)
For high-skilled agents we have z = zH, implying:
∂Γ
∂σ
= G(a∗)
τqwpiX
γ(pi − zL) + [1− G(a
∗)]
τwpiX
γ(pi − zH)
+ G(a∗)X ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
> 0
(A.19)
Hence, high-skilled workers are strictly better off when moving from the benchmark
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scheme to a scheme with actuarial non-neutrality. For the low-skilled agents we have
z = zL, which gives:
∂Γ
∂σ
= G(a∗)
τqwpiX
γ(pi − zL) + [1− G(a
∗)]
τwpiX
γ(pi − zH)
− [1− G(a∗)]X ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
) (A.20)
Suppose that τ → 0. Then ∂Γ/∂σ < 0 implying that low-skilled agents are worse off
after the reform. If on the other hand τ → 1, then zL = zH = 0 so that the last term
vanishes. Therefore ∂Γ/∂σ > 0 which means that low-skilled also benefit from the
reform. We have ∂Γ/∂σ = 0 if τ = τˆ, with τˆ given by equation (39).
To prove that τˆ is a unique solution, we have to show that the derivative ∂Γ/∂σ is
monotonically increasing in τ at σ = 1. Rewrite equation (A.20) in ∂Γ/∂σ = XA, with
A equal to:
A ≡ G(a∗) τqwpi
γ(pi − zL) + [1− G(a
∗)]
τwpi
γ(pi − zH) − [1− G(a
∗)] ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
Since X > 0 the necessary and sufficient condition for ∂Γ/∂σ ≥ 0 is A ≥ 0. This
implies that τˆ is a unique solution if and only if A is monotonically increasing in τ.
Taking the derivative of A with respect to τ gives, after some algebraic manipula-
tions20:
∂A
∂τ
= G(a∗)
qw(γ− qw)
(γ− qw + τqw)2 + [1− G(a
∗)]
w(γ− w)
(γ− w + τw)2
+ [1− G(a∗)] wpi
γ
(
1
pi − zH −
q
pi − zL
)
> 0
(A.21)
This completes the proof.
B Skill-dependent actuarial adjustment
A practical impediment of the reform where the actuarial adjustment of benefits is
based on individual life spans is that life spans are generally not observable at the
individual level. A possible solution to this information problem is to base actuarial
adjustment on characteristics which are (better) observable and are at least to some
extent correlated with individual life expectancies. In terms of our model, this charac-
teristic could be the skill level of agents. The fact that agents are high- or low-skilled
reveals information about their life span. Indeed, the life span of high-skilled agents
is generally higher than that of low-skilled agents. The government can use this in-
20Note that we assume γ > w to make sure that z < 1 for all agents irrespective the size of the pension
scheme (so ∀τ).
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formation by conditioning the actuarial adjustment factor on skill level. This also
reduces the redistribution from low-skilled to high-skilled people.
Actuarial adjustment factor
The adjustment factor is made conditional on skill level with the following life span
indicator:
pˆi =
{
p¯iL ≡
∫ a∗
0
pi
G(a∗) dG if a < a
∗
p¯iH ≡
∫ 1
a∗
pi
1−G(a∗) dG if a > a
∗ (A.22)
With skill-dependent adjustment, the reference life-span measure is conditional on
skill group: pˆi = p¯iL for the low-skilled group and pˆi = p¯iH for the high-skilled group.
The actuarial adjustment factor is:
m =
{
p¯i−h
p¯iL−zL if a < a
∗
p¯i−h
p¯iH−zH if a > a
∗ (A.23)
and pension entitlements are equal to:
P =
{
(pi−zL)(p¯i−h)b
p¯iL−zL if a < a
∗
(pi−zH)(p¯i−h)b
p¯iH−zH if a > a
∗ (A.24)
From equation (A.23) it follows that skill-dependent adjustment reduces redistribu-
tion from short-lived to long-lived ability groups, like with individual actuarial ad-
justment. Indeed, when all agents retire at the statutory retirement date h, it holds
that m > 1 for the low-skilled group while for the high-skilled group m < 1. Low-
skilled agents are compensated for the fact that they have a shorter life span. Contrary
to individual adjustment, however, skill-dependent adjustment does not remove life-
span redistribution completely. Therefore, these transfers will lead to distortions in
the retirement decision. To see this, from equation (A.24) we have:
Ψ(z) ≡ ∂P(z)
∂z
=
{
(pi−p¯iL)p
p¯iL−zL if a < a
∗
(pi−p¯iH)p
p¯iH−zH if a > a
∗ (A.25)
Within a skill group, agents with relatively long life spans (pi > pˆi) still have an incen-
tive to delay retirement and agents with relatively short life spans (pi < pˆi) still prefer
to retire early. These selection effects are smaller, however, than with uniform ad-
justment because the heterogeneity in life expectancy within skill groups is obviously
lower than the life-time heterogeneity in the total population.
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Figure 4: Skill-dependent adjustment: welfare and redistribution
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Notes: Net benefit is expressed in absolute difference from the benchmark and certainty-
equivalent variation is expressed in percent benchmark consumption.
Consumption and retirement
The expressions for consumption and retirement are given by:21
cedu = cben +
1
1+ pi
[
Pedu − Pben − [Ψ(zedu)]
2 pi
2γ
]
(A.26)
zedu = zben +
Ψ(zedu)pi
γ
(A.27)
Retirement behaviour is subject to two different labour supply distortions. The first
distortion is caused by the contribution rate τ which induces early retirement. The
second distortion is caused by the derivative Ψ which reflects the selection effects
associated with life-span heterogeneity.
Welfare effects
Applying skill-dependent adjustment of benefits cannot result in a Pareto improve-
ment. Since this reform removes (at least to some extent) the redistribution from
short-lived to long-lived individuals, the welfare of low-skilled agents rises while the
welfare of the high-skilled falls, as can also be seen in Figure 4. As the pension scheme
is actuarially neutral on average for the high-skilled and low-skilled group, there are
no selection effects that can induce efficiency improvements to compensate the losses
of the high-skilled agents. In this respect, the welfare effects of skill-dependent ad-
justment are comparable with those of individual adjustment.
The following proposition summarizes this result:
21Subscript ’edu’ refers to educational actuarial adjustment of benefits.
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Proposition 4. A pension reform from inflexible Beveridgean pensions towards flexible Bev-
eridgean pensions with skill-dependent actuarial adjustment of pension benefits cannot be a
Pareto improvement.
Proof. The condition for a Pareto improvement is:
Γ ≡ Pedu − Pben − [Ψ(z)]
2 pi
2γ
=
(pi − z)(p¯i − h)
pˆi − z bedu − (pi − h)bben −
[Ψ(z)]2 pi
2γ
≥ 0 (A.28)
where for at least one a-individual this inequality has to hold strictly. We now derive
the following derivative, evaluated at the initial position λ = 0:
∂Γ
∂λ
=
z− h
p¯i − z p¯i(a− a¯)bedu + (p¯i − h)
(
∂bedu
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
)
− p¯i − h
p¯i − z
∂pˆi
∂λ
bedu (A.29)
To prove that this reform cannot be a Pareto improvement, we have to show that for
at least one a-individual equation (A.29) is strictly negative. Let us concentrate on a
high-skilled agent with ability level a = a∗. Using equation (A.22), equation (A.29)
then becomes:
∂Γ(a = a∗)
∂λ
=
zH − h
p¯i − zH p¯i(a
∗ − a¯)bedu︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ1
+(p¯i − h)
(
∂bedu
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
)
− p¯i − h
p¯i − zH
∫ 1
a∗ p¯i(a− a¯)dG
1− G(a∗) bedu︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ2>0
(A.30)
Because p¯i > zH(a) ∀a it follows that |Σ1| < Σ2. We therefore know that the derivative
∂Γ/∂λ < 0 if ∂bedu/∂λ ≤ ∂bben/∂λ, which means that the flexibility reform cannot be
a Pareto improving.
The budget constraint of the pension scheme can be written as
b(p¯i − h)Φ = X (A.31)
with X already defined by equation (A.5) and with Φ equal to:
Φ ≡
∫ a∗
0
[
pi − zL
p¯iL − zL −
(pi − p¯iL)τqwpi
γ(p¯iL − zL)2
]
dG
+
∫ 1
a∗
[
pi − zH
p¯iH − zH −
(pi − p¯iH)τwpi
γ(p¯iH − zH)2
]
dG
(A.32)
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From equation (A.31), we derive:
∂bben
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
∂X
∂λ
(A.33)
∂bedu
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
(
∂X
∂λ
− X ∂Φ
∂λ
)
(A.34)
Hence,
∂bedu
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= − X
p¯i − h
∂Φ
∂λ
(A.35)
From the definition of Φ and applying Leibniz rule, we derive at λ = 0:
∂Φ
∂λ
=
[
1
p¯i − zL −
τqwp¯i
γ(p¯i − zL)2
] ∫ a∗
0
(
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iL
∂λ
)
dG
+
[
1
p¯i − zH −
τwp¯i
γ(p¯i − zH)2
] ∫ 1
a∗
(
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iH
∂λ
)
dG
(A.36)
Notice:
∫ a∗
0
(
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iL
∂λ
)
dG =
∫ a∗
0
[
p¯i(a− a¯)−
∫ a∗
0 p¯i(a− a¯)dG
G(a∗)
]
dG
= p¯i
∫ a∗
0
(a− a¯)dG− p¯i
∫ a∗
0
(a− a¯)dG = 0 (A.37)
Along the same lines, we also have:
∫ 1
a∗
(
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iH
∂λ
)
dG = 0 (A.38)
Hence, we have ∂Φ/∂λ = 0. Therefore, ∂bedu/∂λ = ∂bben/∂λ, which completes the
proof.
C Endogenous skill level
In this appendix we show that the main welfare implications of the pension flexibility
reforms still hold under endogenous schooling. We start with the derivation of the
threshold ability level a∗ for the benchmark model.
C.1 Benchmark model
An agent is indifferent in acquiring skills or not if UL(a) = UH(a)⇒ cH (a∗) = cL (a∗).
Thus, there is a cut-off level of a, denoted a∗ which is given by:
a∗ben = q−
(1− τ)wpi(a∗ben)(1− q2)
2γ
(A.39)
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Agents with ability a < a∗ will not invest in schooling and stay low-skilled and agents
with a > a∗ choose to acquire extra skills and become high-skilled.
From equation (A.39), we can infer the following. First, an increase in the tax rate
τ raises the fraction of low-skilled workers, i.e., ∂a∗/∂τ > 0. The tax rate induces
agents to retire earlier which decreases the return period of schooling investments
and, hence, reduces schooling incentives. Second, an increase in longevity raises the
number of high-skilled individuals, i.e., ∂a∗/∂p¯i < 0. Recall that an increase in the
average life span induces agents to postpone retirement. This increases the incentive
to become high-skilled because the return period of schooling investment becomes
longer.
C.2 Uniform actuarial adjustment
We will show that uniform adjustment can either increase or decrease the schooling
incentives, depending on the fraction of low-skilled agents in the initial situation. We
also show that with endogenous schooling uniform adjustment still induces a Pareto
improvement if the tax rate is sufficiently high.
Cut-off ability level
From equation (27) we obtain:
a∗uni = a
∗
ben −
2γΘ
(1− τ)w [2γ+ (1− τ)w(1− q2)p¯iλ] (A.40)
with,
Θ ≡ P(zH)− P(zL)− [Ψ(zH)]
2 pi
2γ
+
[Ψ(zL)]
2 pi
2γ
From equation (A.40), it follows22:
∂a∗uni
∂λ
=
∂a∗ben
∂λ
− 1
(1− τ)w
∂Θ
∂λ
(A.41)
where we have used that Θ = 0 if λ = 0. Using equations (24) and (25), we derive
from the definition of Θ:
∂Θ
∂λ
=
p¯iX(a∗ − a¯)(zH − zL)
(p¯i − zH)(p¯i − zL) (A.42)
Hence,
∂a∗uni
∂λ
=
∂a∗ben
∂λ
− p¯iX(a
∗
ben − a¯)(zH − zL)
(1− τ)w(p¯i − zH)(p¯i − zL) (A.43)
22Similar to exogenous schooling (see Appendices A.1 and B), we simplify calculations by evaluating
the derivatives at the initial position λ = 0 (i.e., no life-time heterogeneity).
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From this equation it directly follows that ∂a∗uni/∂λ > ∂a
∗
ben/∂λ if a
∗
ben < a¯ and
∂a∗uni/∂λ < ∂a
∗
ben/∂λ if a
∗
ben > a¯. If the marginal agent has an above-average life
span, pi(a∗) > p¯i, this agent has an incentive to postpone retirement. This increases
the incentive to become high-skilled because later retirement raises the return period
of schooling investments. When the marginal agent has a below-average life span,
pi(a∗) < p¯i, this person has an incentive to advance retirement which decreases the
willingness to become high-skilled.
Welfare effects
To show that uniform actuarial adjustment induces a Pareto improvement, we have to
distinguish between agents who change their skill level after this reform and agents
who do not change their skill level.
Non-switching agents. The non-switching group consists of agents who are old at the
time the reform is implemented and young agents who either remain low-skilled,
a < min(a∗ben, a
∗
uni), or high-skilled, a > max(a
∗
ben, a
∗
uni). For this group the Pareto-
improving condition is still given by equation (A.1). Hence, also with endogenous
schooling the condition ∂buni/∂λ ≥ ∂bben/∂λ is a sufficient condition.
Under endogenous schooling, equation (A.8) changes into:
∂buni
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
1
p¯i − h
[
∂X(a∗uni)
∂λ
− ∂X(a
∗
ben)
∂λ
− X(a∗uni)
∂Φ
∂λ
]
(A.44)
From the definition of X, see equation (A.5), we derive at the point λ = 0:
∂X
∂λ
= − τ(1− τ)w
2(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
∂a∗
∂λ
+ τqw
∫ a∗
0
(1− τ)qwp¯i(a− a¯)
γ
dG
+ τw
∫ 1
a∗
(1− τ)wp¯i(a− a¯)
γ
dG
(A.45)
Using equation (A.45), we obtain:
∂X(a∗uni)
∂λ
− ∂X(a
∗
ben)
∂λ
=
τ(1− τ)w2(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
(
∂a∗ben
∂λ
− ∂a
∗
uni
∂λ
)
=
τw(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
∂Θ
∂λ
(A.46)
where we have used equation (A.41) in going from the first line to the second line.
Equation (A.44) can now rewritten in:
∂buni
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
[
τw(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
∂Θ
∂λ
− X ∂Φ
∂λ
]
(A.47)
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The derivative ∂Φ/∂λ is still equal to equation (A.10). That is,
∂Φ
∂λ
=
γ(γ− qw)
(γ− qw + τqw)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠL
∫ a∗
0
(a− a¯)dG + γ(γ− w)
(γ− w + τw)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠH
∫ 1
a∗
(a− a¯)dG (A.48)
Let τ → 0. Then we have ΠH > ΠL implying that ∂Φ/∂λ > 0 for any possible cut-off
point 0 < a∗ < 1. From equation (A.47) then follows ∂bben/∂λ > ∂buni/∂λ. Taking
the other extreme, τ → 1, we obtain ΠH < ΠL so that ∂Φ/∂λ < 0 for any value
0 < a∗ < 1. This implies from equation (A.47) that ∂bben/∂λ < ∂buni/∂λ. As ∂Φ/∂λ is
continuous at 0 < τ < 1, there exist tax rates τ for which ∂bben/∂λ ≥ ∂buni/∂λ.
Switching agents. The switching group consists of young agents who switch from i)
either low-skilled to high-skilled, which occurs if a∗ben > a¯, or from ii) high-skilled to
low-skilled, which occurs if a∗ben < a¯.
i) Suppose a∗ben > a¯. Then the Pareto-improving condition is given by:
Γ ≡ Puni − Pben − [Ψ(z)]
2pi
2γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ1
+ (1− τ)w(a− q) + (1− q
2)(1− τ)2w2pi
2γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ2
≥ 0
(A.49)
Compared to the non-switching group, we now have an additional term Υ2 which
is due to the fact that switching agents are confronted with a different wage rate.
Note that in the initial point λ = 0 we still have Γ = 0. Taking the derivative
with respect to λ and evaluating the resulting expression at λ = 0, gives:
∂Γ
∂λ
=
∂Υ1
∂λ
+
(1− q2)(1− τ)2w2p¯i(a− a¯)
2γ
(A.50)
Let the tax rate be set such that ∂Υ1/∂λ ≥ 0. At λ = 0 we have a = a∗uni = a∗ben > a¯
for the switching group. Hence, ∂Γ/∂λ > 0 which means that for the switching
young the Pareto-improving condition is satisfied.
ii) Suppose a∗ben < a¯. Then the Pareto-improving condition is given by:
Γ ≡ Υ1 + (1− τ)w(q− a) + (q
2 − 1)(1− τ)2w2pi
2γ
≥ 0 (A.51)
Taking the derivative with respect to λ gives:
∂Γ
∂λ
=
∂Υ1
∂λ
+
(q2 − 1)(1− τ)2w2p¯i(a− a¯)
2γ
(A.52)
Suppose again that the tax rate is set such that ∂Υ1/∂λ ≥ 0. At λ = 0, we now
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have a = a∗uni = a
∗
ben < a¯ for the switching group. Hence, ∂Γ/∂λ > 0 which
means that also for this case the Pareto-improving condition of the switching
group is satisfied.
C.3 Actuarially non-neutral adjustment
In this section, we show that stimulating retirement postponement in actuarially non-
neutral way improves the incentives to become skilled. We also show that such a
reform can lead to a Pareto improvement.
Cut-off ability level
The cut-off point is determined by the condition UH (a∗) = UL (a∗) ⇒ cH (a∗) =
cL (a∗). From equation (36) we can infer:
a∗nan = a∗ben −
Θ
(1− τ)w (A.53)
with Θ again defined as,
Θ ≡ P(zH)− P(zL)− [Ψ(zH)]
2 pi
2γ
+
[Ψ(zL)]
2 pi
2γ
Take the derivative of equation (A.53) with respect to σ, evaluated at the initial point
σ = 1:23
∂a∗nan
∂σ
=
∂a∗ben
∂σ
− 1
(1− τ)w
∂Θ
∂σ
(A.54)
where we have used that Θ = 0 if σ = 1. Using equations (34) and (35), we derive
from the definition of Θ:
∂Θ
∂σ
= X ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
> 0 (A.55)
Hence, ∂a∗nan/∂σ < ∂a∗ben/∂σ.
Welfare effects
Non-switching agents. The non-switching group consists of agents who are old at the
time the reform is implemented and of young agents who either remain low-skilled,
a < min(a∗ben, a
∗
uni), or high-skilled, a > max(a
∗
ben, a
∗
uni). For this group the Pareto-
improving condition is still given by equation (A.11).
23Similar to exogenous schooling (see Section A.2), we abstract from life-span heterogeneity and eval-
uate derivatives at the initial position σ = 1 (i.e., actuarial neutrality).
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With endogenous schooling, equation (A.16) changes into:
∂b
∂σ
=
1
pi − h
(
∂X
∂σ
− X ∂Φ
∂σ
)
(A.56)
Using equation (A.5), we have at σ = 1:
∂X
∂σ
= −τ(1− τ)w
2(1− q2)pi
2γ
∂a∗
∂σ
=
τw(1− q2)piX
2γ
ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
> 0 (A.57)
where we have used equation (A.55) when going from the first to the second line.
Note that this derivative is positive because zH > zL. The derivative ∂Φ/∂σ is still
given by equation (A.17). Substituting this equation together with equation (A.57)
into equation (A.56) and inserting the resulting expression in equation (A.12) ulti-
mately implies:
∂Γ
∂σ
= G(a∗)X
[
ln(pi − zL) + τqwpi
γ(pi − zL)
]
+
τw(1− q2)piX
2γ
ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
+ [1− G(a∗)]X
[
ln(pi − zH) + τwpi
γ(pi − zH)
]
− X ln(pi − z)
(A.58)
For high-skilled agents we have z = zH, implying:
∂Γ
∂σ
= G(a∗)
τqwpiX
γ(pi − zL) + [1− G(a
∗)]
τwpiX
γ(pi − zH)
+ X
[
G(a∗) +
τw(1− q2)pi
2γ
]
ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
)
> 0
(A.59)
Hence, high-skilled workers are strictly better off when moving from the benchmark
scheme to a scheme with actuarial non-neutrality. For low-skilled people with z = zL
the condition becomes
∂Γ
∂σ
= G(a∗)
τqwpiX
γ(pi − zL) + [1− G(a
∗)]
τwpiX
γ(pi − zH)
+ X
[
τw(1− q2)pi
2γ
− 1+ G(a∗)
]
ln
(
pi − zL
pi − zH
) (A.60)
Suppose that τ → 0. Then ∂Γ/∂σ < 0 implying that low-skilled agents are worse
off after the reform. If on the other hand τ → 1, then zL = zH → 0 so that the last
term vanishes. Therefore ∂Γ/∂σ > 0 which means that low-skilled also benefit from
the reform. As ∂Γ/∂σ is continuous at 0 < τ < 1, there exist tax rates τ such that
∂Γ/∂σ > 0.
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Switching agents. With actuarially non-neutral adjustment the switching group only
consists of young agents who choose to become high-skilled, a∗nan < a < a∗ben. The
Pareto-improving condition then equals:
Γ ≡ Pnan − Pben − [Ψ(z)]
2 pi
2γ
+ (1− τ)w(a− q) + (1− q
2)(1− τ)2w2pi
2γ
(A.61)
Notice that the derivative of Γ with respect to σ is exactly the same as for the non-
switching group and given by equation (A.59).
C.4 Skill-dependent actuarial adjustment
In this final section, we show in this section that skill-dependent actuarial adjustment
negatively affects the incentives to become skilled. In addition, analogue to exoge-
nous schooling, this reform cannot be a Pareto improvement.
Cut-off ability level
Skill-dependent actuarial adjustment will changes schooling because it introduces an
endogenous link between the schooling decision and the actuarial adjustment factor.
Using equation (A.26) we can infer:
a∗edu = a
∗
ben −
2γΘ
(1− τ)w [2γ+ (1− τ)w(1− q2)p¯iλ] (A.62)
with,
Θ ≡ P(zH)− P(zL)− [Ψ(zH)]
2 pi
2γ
+
[Ψ(zL)]
2 pi
2γ
Take the derivative of (A.62) with respect to λ, evaluated at λ = 0:
∂a∗edu
∂λ
=
∂a∗ben
∂λ
− 1
(1− τ)w
∂Θ
∂λ
(A.63)
From the definition of Θ it follows:
∂Θ
∂λ
=
X
p¯i − zH
[
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iH
∂λ
]
− X
p¯i − zL
[
∂pi
∂λ
− ∂p¯iL
∂λ
]
(A.64)
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From equations (5) and (A.22), we obtain for λ = 0:
∂pi(a∗)
∂λ
= p¯i(a∗ − a¯) (A.65)
∂p¯iL
∂λ
=
∫ a∗
0 p¯i(a− a¯)dG
G(a∗)
(A.66)
∂p¯iH
∂λ
=
∫ 1
a∗ p¯i(a− a¯)dG
1− G(a∗) (A.67)
Substituting these expressions in equation (A.64) and rearranging, gives:
∂Θ
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
X
p¯i − zL
∫ a∗
0 p¯i(a− a∗)dG
G(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− X
p¯i − zH
∫ 1
a∗ p¯i(a− a∗)dG
1− G(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0 (A.68)
An increase in λ reduces Θ and using equation (A.63) this implies that ∂a∗edu/∂λ >
∂a∗ben/∂λ. With educational-specific actuarial adjustment, individuals can self-select
the actuarial adjustment factor with their skill level. If they choose to become high-
skilled this reduces ceteris paribus the conversion factor because this is now based on
the average longevity of the high-skilled people. Individuals just at or around the
margin will therefore find it less attractive to become high-skilled.
Welfare effects
Since the reform leads to fewer high-skilled agents, a high-skilled agent with ability
a = a∗edu is also a high-skilled person in the benchmark case. Therefore, the Pareto-
improving condition for this agent is still given by equation (A.28). This implies
that ∂bedu/∂λ ≤ ∂bben/∂λ is again a sufficient condition to reject the existence of a
Pareto improvement. To show that this condition holds, notice that under endoge-
nous schooling equation (A.35) changes into:
∂bedu
∂λ
− ∂bben
∂λ
=
1
p¯i − h
[
∂X(a∗edu)
∂λ
− ∂X(a
∗
ben)
∂λ
− X(a∗edu)
∂Φ
∂λ
]
(A.69)
Using equations (A.45) and (A.63), we obtain in λ = 0:
∂X(a∗edu)
∂λ
− ∂X(a
∗
ben)
∂λ
=
τ(1− τ)w2(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
(
∂a∗ben
∂λ
− ∂a
∗
edu
∂λ
)
=
τw(1− q2)p¯i
2γ
∂Θ
∂λ
< 0 (A.70)
With endogenous schooling, there still holds ∂Φ/∂λ = 0. Equation (A.69) then im-
plies ∂bedu/∂λ < ∂bben/∂λ.
39
